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John Shook and James Good have each made significant contributions to the schol-
arly discussion of John Dewey’s “permanent Hegelian deposit.” In this collection, 
they come together to further develop their respective analyses of Dewey’s Hegelian-
ism. The volume combines two essays, one from each of the authors, in addition to 
the “definitive text” of Dewey’s own 1897 lecture on Hegel, given at the University 
of Chicago, and entitled “Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit.” In comparison to Shook’s 
earlier, more comprehensive work on Dewey’s relationship to Hegel, Dewey’s Em-
pirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality (2000), and Good’s similarly intensive 
treatment, A Search for Unity in Diversity: The “Permanent Hegelian Deposit” in 
the Philosophy of John Dewey (2006), the two essays, even in combination with one 
another, are somewhat fractional and incomplete. The essays succeed, however, in 
furthering our understanding of the way Dewey’s Hegelianism can illuminate his 
mature philosophy.
In the first essay, “Dewey’s Naturalized Philosophy of Spirit and Religion,” 
Shook explores how Dewey maintained a place for “religious” faith in his pragma-
tism despite his antipathy toward organized religion. Drawing on several of Dewey’s 
texts, and in particular A Common Faith (1934), Shook interprets Deweyan faith as a 
practical tool which sustains individuals in pursuit of their self-chosen ends (34-35). 
For Dewey, an ideal cannot be achieved without overcoming obstacles in its pursuit. 
Since persistence does not guarantee success, faith in the possibility of achieving the 
ideal is necessary for persevering through inevitable setbacks. Alluding to Dewey’s 
distinction between “religion” and “the religious,” Shook describes how Dewey 
saw adherence to organized religion as ineffective for coping in a fundamentally 
uncertain world. Dewey viewed “any belief in the existence of a divine power to 
be incompatible with naturalism and quite irrelevant for a genuinely religious life” 
(19). “Religious” individuals, on the other hand, rather than simply trusting in the 
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protection of an external divine entity, possess the necessary faith not to abandon 
pursuit of self-chosen ends when confronted with a devastating loss: “The religious, 
according to Dewey, do not surrender their ideals and moral convictions in the face 
of tragedy, and neither do they repose in certainty about guaranteed ideals” (36). 
This is the pragmatic value of Deweyan faith; and for Shook, it exhibits substantial 
Hegelian influence. He presents Dewey’s notion that there is religious quality to 
our practical engagements with our surroundings as a translation of Hegel’s con-
cept of the divine manifesting itself through purposive human action. He argues 
that “Dewey understood and presented Hegel as taking this generally pragmatic 
approach to religion” (17). Shook’s analysis thus allows us to conceptualize Dewey’s 
use of religious language in terms consistent with his pragmatism, once we see his 
religious views as “a prominent illustration of the way that he remained indebted 
to Hegel throughout his long career” (31).
In the second essay, “Rereading Dewey’s ‘Permanent Hegelian Deposit,’” Good 
provides a sustained analysis of Dewey’s 1897 lecture on Hegel. His purpose is to 
further develop the central claim of his 2006 book, namely, that Dewey’s break 
with the British neo-Hegelians during the 1890s was not a break with Hegel him-
self. Rather, it was a move toward a humanist/historicist reading of Hegel and away 
from the neo-Hegelians’ metaphysical/theological reading. Good explains how it 
is “assumed that Dewey’s pragmatic notion that ideas have real effects in the world 
was at odds with Hegelian philosophy. But Dewey’s lecture ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Spirit’ demonstrates that he saw this pragmatic account of ideas in Hegel” (66). 
Good particularly emphasizes the way “Dewey’s claim [in the 1897 lecture] that 
Hegel was a great actualist markedly contrasts with the common characterization 
of Hegel as the grand metaphysician who reduced the particularities of experience 
to transient nodes of a dynamic, eternal, and transcendent supreme being” (66). 
This accurately depicts Dewey and Hegel’s shared distaste for mere abstraction 
from concrete action, and their conviction that any idea, or concept, only attains 
actuality in being progressively worked out through experience. Thus, in contrast 
to the static, “transcendent absolute” that neo-Hegelians such as T.H. Green find 
so attractive, Dewey’s Hegel is committed to the continuous engagement with the 
practical conflicts of ordinary experience, and does not require any entity separate 
from experience to drive this movement: “Dewey’s lecture ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Spirit,’ in conjunction with Dewey’s critique of Green’s moral thought, demon-
strates that his rejection of neo-Hegelianism during the early 1890s should not be 
equated with a rejection of Hegel” (71-72). For Dewey, then, the Hegelian Absolute 
refers not to any static, divine achievement, but rather to the continuous, infinite 
development of human achievements.
So what is Dewey’s philosophy of spirit? Neither Shook nor Good clearly an-
swers this question. In particular, I think the authors could have been more precise 
in their definitions of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, and in their accounts of how this 
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concept connects with Dewey’s pragmatism. Shook asserts that “Dewey’s philosophy 
of spirit is his theory of the social conditions for the growth of individuality” (55). 
In slightly different terms, Good explains how “the unity of Hegel’s absolute spirit 
is constantly being sundered and re-created by adversity and diversity (Hegel’s ne-
gation). Hence particular identities are not a mere means to a final state of matura-
tion in which they will be abolished but are the essential engine of its never-ending 
growth” (61). He then states that Dewey’s philosophy of education, which “char-
acterizes education as perpetual growth . . . formulates a philosophy of spirit” (61). 
I would not say either of these descriptions is off the mark; it is certainly true that 
Dewey’s ideal of self-directed, continuous growth cannot exist apart from neces-
sary social conditions, and it is true that Hegel’s Spirit requires particular identities 
to drive its growth—much like Dewey's description of individuals and communi-
ties that continuously develop through the activities of communication, inquiry, 
and action. However, I think we can draw a more precise link between Spirit and 
pragmatism, and explain in clearer terms what is required of individuals and col-
lectivities if they are to contribute to Spirit’s continuous progression.
In The Phenomenology of Spirit ([1807] 1977), Hegel states that “Spirit is the 
knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself; the being that is the move-
ment of retaining its self-identity in its otherness” (459). The being which manifests 
Spirit thus “sees itself” in what negates it, and moves Spirit forward by negating 
negation. In the 1897 lecture on Hegel presented in this volume, Dewey empha-
sizes the link between Spirit and the negation of negation. He points out that for 
Hegel, “it is of the very nature of . . . spirit, to oppose itself and through this op-
position to reach its own realized development” (107). Spirit is then actualized by 
the movement to negate such negation: “opposition is constantly overcome in the 
very life of the spirit itself” (107). On Dewey’s reading, Hegel’s Spirit is not separate 
from individuals’ lived experience, but rather realized through it: “the individual 
is himself an expression of the absolute spirit . . . ” (113). This connection of Spirit 
with the individual act of negating negation, however, is not highlighted by Shook 
or Good, despite Dewey’s emphasis on this point in his lecture. For Dewey (and 
Hegel), individuals demonstrate a “spiritual” (rather than merely “natural”) exis-
tence by stamping themselves onto the world in a reflective, self-chosen way; and 
this spiritual action requires “[utilizing] the material of nature by forming out of it 
ends and ideals and then proceeding to realize these ends” (119).
Dewey’s philosophy of spirit is thus intimately connected with individuals’ 
practical activity. Individuals formulate their own ends, and give themselves ob-
jective existence through action toward those ends, which, in turn, drives the ac-
tualization of spirit. Hegel’s Spirit is the distinctly human power of overcoming 
contradiction, or, of synthesizing the opposing elements generated by any human 
action. So, it is required of spiritual individuals to “see themselves in” the negation 
brought about by new experiences, and to put forward the effort to negate the ne-
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gation. That Dewey shares such a philosophy of spirit with Hegel is evident in The 
Quest for Certainty (1929). He describes a “scientific attitude” which is “capable of 
enjoying the doubtful” (228), and which can “effect the transformation of the ob-
scure and perplexing situations of experience into clear and resolved situations” 
(124). This negation of negations, this resolution of problematic situations, requires 
that individuals initially feel unsettled and anxious about a disruption in the situa-
tion. It is an experience that Dewey describes in How We Think (1910) as “a condi-
tion of mental unrest and disturbance” (13). As he explains in Human Nature and 
Conduct (1922), this disturbed state is necessary if individuals are to take the already 
accomplished work of Spirit, the “long record of past experimentation in conduct,” 
and move Spirit forward by “observ[ing] how old principles actually work under 
new conditions,” and “modify[ing] them so that they will be more effectual instru-
ments in judging new cases” (239). By moving Spirit forward, individuals generate 
greater certainty for themselves in a world where complete certainty is unattain-
able—an important insight for both Dewey and Hegel. The connection between 
Hegel’s Spirit and Dewey’s pragmatism can thus be found in their shared focus on 
the most effective ways of overcoming the obstacles intrinsic to lived experience 
for the purpose of generating a more stable future. Hence, if we are to identify a 
Hegel-inspired philosophy of “spirit” in Dewey’s thought, and also shore up the im-
precise aspects of Shook and Good’s analyses, it is worthwhile to recognize Spirit 
as a movement through contradiction which is progressively actualized through 
individuals’ own pragmatic activity. 
Overall, this volume represents a constructive extension of the authors’ pre-
vious work on Dewey’s relationship with Hegel. Shook’s 2000 book argued that 
Dewey, instead of breaking from Hegelian idealism, developed a consistent ideal-
ism which dealt seriously with lived experience. Good’s 2006 work went further 
by distinguishing Dewey’s humanist/historicist interpretation of Hegel from the 
metaphysical/theological reading by the British neo-Hegelians. The essays in this 
volume are narrower in scope, but they do show how Dewey’s “religious faith” can 
be illuminated through his relationship to Hegel, and how his 1897 lecture on Hegel 
further differentiates his own reading of Hegel from that of the neo-Hegelians. I 
would have liked greater precision in the conceptualization of Dewey’s philosophy 
of spirit, specifically how the movement of spirit is carried forward through indi-
vidual action. Nevertheless, Shook and Good’s volume successfully makes the case 
that we cannot fully understand Dewey’s pragmatism without also first gaining a 
better understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit.
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